Abstract. In this paper, we show that the conditional frequentist method of testing a precise hypothesis can be made virtually equivalent to Bayesian testing. The conditioning strategy proposed by Berger, Brown and Wolpert in 1994, for the simple versus simple case, is generalized to testing a precise null hypothesis versus a composite alternative hypothesis. Using this strategy, both the conditional frequentist and the Bayesian will report the same error probabilities upon rejecting or accepting. This is of considerable interest because it is often perceived that Bayesian and frequentist testing are incompatible in this situation. That they are compatible, when conditional frequentist testing is allowed, is a strong indication that the "wrong" frequentist tests are currently being used for postexperimental assessment of accuracy. The new unified testing procedure is discussed and illustrated in several common testing situations.
INTRODUCTION
Savage (19631, Berger and Sellke (1987) , Berger and Delampady (1987) and Delampady and Berger The problem of testing statistical hypotheses has (1990) have reviewed the practicality of the P-value been one of the focal points for disagreement beand explored the dramatic conflict between the tween Bayesians and frequentists. The classical P-value and other data-dependent measures of evfrequentist approach constructs a rejection region idence. Indeed, they demonstrate that the P-value and reports associated error probabilities. Incorrect can be highly misleading as a measure of the rejection of the null hypothesis Ho, the Type I erevidence provided by the data against the null hyror, has probability a , and incorrect acceptance of pothesis. Because this point is of central importance Ho, the Type 1 1error, has probability P. Use of this in motivating the need for the development here, traditional (a, @)-frequentkt approach in postexperwe digress with an illustration of the problem. imental inference has been criticized for reporting error probabilities that do not reflect information
ILLUSTRATIONSuppose that one faces a long 1. provided by the given data. Thus a common alterseries of exploratory tests of possible new drugs for native is to use the P-value as a data-dependent AIDS. We presume that some percentage of this semeasure of the strength of evidence against the null ries of drugs are essentially ineffective. (Below, we hypothesis Ho. However, the P-value is not a true will imagine this percentage to be 50%, but the same frequentist measure and has its own shortcomings point could be made with any given percentage.) as a measure of evidence. Edwards, Lindman and Each drug is tested in an independent experiment, corresponding to a test of no treatment effect based J 0.Berger is Arts and Sciences Professor, Institute on normal data. For each drug, the P-value is comof Statistics and Decision Sciences, Duke Univerputed, and those with P-values smaller than 0.05 sity, Durham, North Carolina 27708-0251 (e-mail: are deemed to be effective. (This is perhaps an unberger@stat.duke.edu). B. Boukai is Associate Profair caricature of standard practice, but that is not fessor and Y: Wang was a Ph.D. student, Departrelevant to the point we are trying to make about ment of Mathematical Sciences, Indiana University-P-values.) Purdue University, Indianapolis, Indiana 46202
Suppose a doctor reads the results of the pub-(e-mail: boukai@math.iupui.edu).
lished studies, but feels confused about the mean-ing of P-values. (Let us even assume here that all studies are published, whether they obtain statistical significance or not; the real situation of publication selection bias only worsens the situation.) So, in hopes of achieving a better understanding, the doctor asks the resident statistician to answer a simple question: "A number of these published studies have P-values that are between 0.04 and 0.05; of those, what fraction of the corresponding drugs are ineffective?" The statistician cannot provide a firm answer to this question, but can provide useful bounds if the doctor is willing to postulate a prior opinion that a certain percentage of the drugs being originally tested (say, 5096, as mentioned above) were ineffective. In particular, it is then the case that at least 23% of the drugs having P-values between 0.04 and 0.05 are ineffective, and in practice typically 50% or more will be ineffective (see Berger and Sellke, 1987) . Relating to this last number, the doctor concludes: "So if I start out believing that a certain percentage of the drugs will be ineffective, then a Pvalue near 0.05 does not change my opinion much at all; I should still think that about the same percentage of those with a P-value near 0.05 are ineffective." That is an essentially correct interpretation.
We cast this discussion in a frequentist framework to emphasize that this is a fundamental fact about P-values; in situations such as that here, involving testing a precise null hypothesis, a P-value of 0.05 essentially does not provide any evidence against the null hypothesis. Note, however, that the situation is quite different in situations where there is not a precise null hypothesis; then it will often be the case that only about 1 out of 20 of the drugs with a P-value of 0.05 will be ineffective, assuming that the initial percentage of ineffective drugs is again 50% (cf. Casella and Berger, 1987) . In a sense, though, this only acerbates the problem; it implies that the interpretation of P-values will change drastically from problem to problem, making them highly questionable as a useful tool for statistical communication.
To rectify these deficiencies, there have been many attempts to modify the classical frequentist approach by incorporating data-dependent procedures which are based on conditioning. Earlier works in this direction are summarized in Kiefer (1977) and in Berger and Wolpert (1988) . In a seminal series of papers, Kiefer (1975 Kiefer ( , 1976 Kiefer ( , 1977 and Brownie and Kiefer (1977) , the conditional frequentist approach was formalized. The basic idea behind this approach is to condition on a statistic measuring the evidential strength of the data, and then to provide error probabilities conditional on the observed value of this statistic. Unfortunately, the approach never achieved substantial popularity, in part because of the difficulty of choosing the statistic upon which to condition (cf. Kiefer, 1977, Discussion) .
A prominent alternative approach to testing is the Bayesian approach, which is based on the most extreme form of conditioning, namely, conditioning on the given data. There have been many attempts (see, e.g., Good, 1992) to suggest compromises between the Bayesian and the frequentist approaches. However, these compromises have not been adopted by practitioners of statistical analysis, perhaps because they lacked a complete justification from either perspective.
Recently, Berger, Brown and Wolpert (1994; henceforth, BBW) considered the testing of simple versus simple hypotheses and showed that the conditional frequentist method can be made equivalent to the Bayesian method. This was done by finding a conditioning statistic which allows an agreement between the two approaches. The surprising aspect of this result is not that both the Bayesian and the conditional frequentist might have the same decision rule for rejecting or accepting the null hypothesis (this is not so uncommon), but rather that they will report the same (conditional) error probabilities upon rejecting or accepting. That is, the error probabilities reported by the conditional frequentist using the proposed conditioning strategy are the same as the posterior probabilities of the relevant errors reported by the Bayesian.
The appeal of such a testing procedure is evident. The proposed test and the suggested conditioning strategy do not comprise a compromise between the Bayesian and the frequentist approaches, but rather indicate that there is a way of testing that is simultaneously frequentist and Bayesian. The advantages of this "unification" include the following:
(i) Data-dependent error probabilities are utilized, overcoming the chief objection to ( a ,P )-frequentist testing in postexperimental settings. These are actual error probabilities and hence do not suffer the type of misinterpretation that can arise with P-values.
(ii) Many statisticians are comfortable with a procedure only when it has simultaneous Bayesian and frequentist justifications. The testing procedure we propose, for testing a simple null hypothesis versus a composite alternative, is the first we know of that possesses this simultaneous interpretation (for this problem).
(iii) A severe pedagogical problem is the common misinterpretation among practitioners of frequen-135 UNIFIED FREQUENTIST-BAYESIAN TESTING tist error probabilities as posterior probabilities of hypotheses. By using a for which the two are numerically equal, this concern is obviated.
(iv) Since the approach is Bayesianly justifiable, one can take advantage of numerous Bayesian simplifications. For instance, the stopping rule (in, say, a clinical trial) does not affect the reported error probabilities; hence one does not need to embark upon the difficult (and controversial) path of judging how to "spend a" for "looks at the data." (A full discussion of sequential aspects of the procedure would be too lengthy. See BBW for discussion in the simple versus simple case; we will report on the sequential situation for composite hypotheses in a later paper.)
Most "Bayesian-frequentist agreement" articles end up arguing that the "classical" procedures be--ing used today are satisfactory from either viewpoint. It is noteworthy that this is not the case here. In effect, we argue that the Bayesian procedure is correct, in part because it has a very sensible conditional frequentist interpretation; but this procedure is very different than what is typically used in practice. Hence we are proposing a serious change in practical statistical methodology.
The general development given later may appear to be somewhat involved technically, but the new tests that result are often quite simple. To illustrate this, as well as some of the comparison issues mentioned above, we end the Introduction with an example. EXAMPLE 1. Suppose that XI, X2, . ..,X, are n i.i.d. random variables from a normal distribution having unknown mean 0 and known variance a2 [i.e., the M(0, a 2 ) distribution] and denote by X, = C Xi/n their average; thus X, -M(0, a2/n).
Based on the observed value 5, of x,, we are interested in testing Ho: 0 = do versus HI: 0 # Oo. Consider the following three testing procedures, defined in terms of the standard statistic z = ,hi(?, -O0)/a: -zffI2, reject Hoand report error probability a , T c if lzl < zaI2, accept Hoand report error probability P(0), where a and P(0) are the probabilities of Type I and Type I1 errors and za12 is the usual critical value; since P(0) depends on the unknown 0, it is common to choose a "subjectively important7' value (or two) of 0 and report p at that (or those) points. 
where B(z) = ,/"exp{-z2/(2 + n-l)) and a is a constant defined in (4.7); a good approximation to a is a G log(5n) -loglog(1 + 2n). As we will see later, a* and p*have a dual interpretation as (i) (conditional) frequentist Type I and Type I1 error probabilities and (ii) the posterior probabilities of H o and H I , respectively.
To see these three tests in action, suppose n = 20, 6, = 0, a2= 1, and a = 0.05 for T c and T p ,and 0 = 1 is deemed to be of interest for Type I1 error under Tc. Table 1summarizes the conclusions from each test for various values of z. Note that za12 = 1.96 and a = 3.26.
The acceptance and rejection regions of all three tests are the same, except that TT makes no decision when 1.18 < lzl < 1.96. (This agreement is a convenient coincidence for this illustration, but will not happen in general.) The differences between the tests, therefore, are in the "error probabilities" that are reported.
Compare, first, T c and TT. The error probabilities for T c are fixed, while those for Ty vary with 121. In the rejection region, for instance, T c always reports a = 0.05, while Ty reports error probabilities ranging from nearly 112 (when lzl = 1.96) to a* = 0.0026 (when lzl = 4). The variability in the reports for TT is appealing.
Compare, next T p and T> An immediate advantage of Ty is that it can "accept" Ho, with specified error probability, while the P-value (or 1-p ) is in no sense an error probability for acceptance (for discussion, see the articles mentioned at the beginning of the Introduction). In the rejection region, p does vary with 121, but it is smaller than a* by a factor of at least 10. Since we will argue that a* is a sensible
TABLE1
Conclusions from the classical, P-value and conditional tests when n = 20 and a = 0.05
conditional error probability, this discrepancy provides further evidence that P-values can be highly misleading (if interpreted as conditional error prob-. abilities). Indeed, in the situation of Illustration 1, note that a* = 0.496 (for those drugs where the Pvalue is 0.051, which would correctly reflect the fact that, typically, about 50% of these drugs will still be ineffective.
A comment is in order about the "no-decision" region in Ty.In practice the no-decision region is typically innocuous, corresponding to a region in which virtually no statistician would feel that the evidence is strong enough for a conclusive decision. The nodecision region could be eliminated, but a t the expense of introducing some counterintuitive properties of the test. Indeed, when this is more fully discussed in Section 2.4, it will be observed that, in some settings, even unconditional frequentists should probably introduce a no-decision region to avoid paradoxical behavior.
NOTATION AND THE "SIMPLE" HYPOTHESES CASE

The Frequentist and Conditional Frequentist Approaches
Suppose we observe the realization x of the random variable X E T and wish to test the following "simple" hypotheses: (2.1) Ho: X -mo(x) versus HI: X -ml(x), where mo and m1 are two specified probability density functions (p.d.f. The conditional frequentist approach allows the reporting of data-dependent error probabilities. In this approach, one considers some statistic S(X), where larger values of S ( X ) indicate data with greater evidentiary strength (for, or against, Ho) and then reports error probabilities conditional on S ( X ) = s, where s denotes the observed value of S(X). For the test (2.3), the resulting conditional error probabilities are given by a(s) = Pr(Type I error IS(X) = s) When no specific prior probabilities of the hypotheses are available, it is intuitively appealing to choose T,,= 112 in (2.7). We will use this default choice in the remainder of the paper (although generalizations to other 9are possible, following the approach in BBW). With this default prior probability, the posterior probability in (2.7) becomes and the posterior probability that H1 is true is
The standard Bayesian test for this situation can then be written as if B(x) 5 1, reject H, and report the posterior probability a*(Btx)), if B(x) > 1, accept H, and report the posterior probability P*(Btx)).
(This is, indeed, the optimal Bayesian test if "0-1" loss is used; again, other losses could be considered, following the lines of BBW.)
The Modified Bayesian Test
The formal similarities between the conditional frequentist test (2.5) and the test T1 are quite pronounced. In fact, BBW have shown that a modification of T1 can be given a meaningful conditional frequentist interpretation, when testing simple versus simple hypotheses. They modified the test T1 to include a no-decision region and suggested a conditioning strategy under which the conditional frequentist test will agree with this modified Bayesian test.
For
) and define r = 1 and a = +(I), if +(I) 2 1, (2.10) r = +-l(1) and a = 1 if +(I) < 1.
Consider the test of H, versus H1 given by if B(x) 5 r , reject H, and report the conditional error probability a*(B(x)), if r < B(x) < a , make no decision, if B(x) > a , accept H, and report the conditional error probability P*(B(x)).
The "surprise" observed in BBW (see also Wolpert, 1995) is that T; is also a conditional frequentist test, arising from use of the conditioning statistic over the domain X* = {X: 0 5 S ( X ) 5 r). (The complement of X*is the no-decision region.) Thus, the conditional frequentist who uses the acceptance and rejection regions in T;, along with the conditioning statistic in (2.11), will report conditional error probabilities upon accepting or rejecting which are in complete agreement with the Bayesian posterior probabilities. That is, a(s) = a*(B) and P(s) = P*(B). [Using (2.11),it can be seen that, in terms of s, a(s) = s / ( l + S) and P(s) = 1/(1+ $(s)).l
The main justification for using (2.11)as the conditioning statistic is that it results in all the desirable consequences discussed in the Introduction. In general it is not an ancillary statistic (except under the "symmetry" condition discussed in BBW). We delay further discussion until Section 5. EXAMPLE 2 (Continued). Simple computation yields $(b) = 2,,/I -b/2, so $(I) = 2/2 1. Hence r = 1 and a = &,so that the no-decision region is the interval (1, A).The reported error probabilities, upon rejection or acceptance, are again given by (2.8) and (2.9).
The No-Decision Region and Alternate Tests
The no-decision region in the new testing procedure can be a source of criticism. Note that, without the no-decision region, T*,would be the optimal Bayes test T1 for a Bayesian (who assumes equal prior probabilities of the hypotheses as well as "0-1" loss). In a sense, the no-decision region is the "price" that must be paid in order to have the reported Bayesian error probabilities also be conditional frequentist error probabilities. Thus, the "size" of the no-decision region is a particularly important feature to study.
We will see considerable numerical evidence that the no-decision region is typically rather small, containing only moderate B(x) that would rarely be considered to be strong evidence. Furthermore, when the data consists of n i.i.d. observations from mo or ml, the probability content of the no-decision region decays exponentially fast to zero (under either hypothesis). To be more precise, from a large deviation result, it follows immediately that, for the test Ti and under certain conditions (cf. Chernoff, 1972 , Section 9.1, pages 42-48), for i = 0,1, as n -+oo,where
Ostsl It should also be clear, from (2.101, that the nodecision region disappears whenever F o ( l ) = 1 -F1(l), in which case r = a = 1. This can happen in cases with likelihood ratio symmetry (for definition and discussion see BBW).
The no-decision region in TT could be eliminated. An alternative test without such a region, which was proposed in BBW, is if B(x) 5 c, reject Hoand report the conditional error probability a*(B(x)), if B(x) > c, accept Ho and report the conditional error probability P*(B(x));
here the "critical value" c is the solution to Fo(c)= 1-Fl(c) (i.e., the critical value for the classical test with equal error probabilities).
The reason we prefer TT to Tz is that, from a Bayesian perspective, it is not sensible to accept or reject when the odds favor the opposite action (at least if the hypotheses have equal prior probabilities and the losses of incorrect actions are equal, as we are assuming). Suppose, for instance, that c = 5. Then Tz would "reject Hon when B(x) = 4, even though B(x) = 4 would typically be interpreted (by a Bayesian) as 440-1 evidence in favor of Ho. For a Bayesian, the inclusion of the no-decision region prevents this counterintuitive behavior from occurring.
Even for a classical frequentist, the inclusion of a no-decision region helps alleviate some paradoxical behavior of the unconditional test. To see this, consider two traditional (unconditional) statisticians, A and B, who intend, based on the same observation x on X, to construct a size-a most powerful test [as given in (2.3)l for testing between two simple hypotheses, X -mo(x) or X -ml(x). Further, suppose that both statisticians are indifferent to the choice of the p.d.f. for the null hypothesis (this situation is not that considered in the rest of the paper, in which H1 is composite; we include this discussion here only to indicate that no-decision regions are not unnatural in related contexts): The difficulty arises whenever co # el, in which case the set * is not empty. This set is the set of disagreement between the two statisticians, where they will reach different conclusions. This is troubling if their initial feelings about the two hypotheses were symmetric, in terms of (say) loss and believability, and if they felt required to use (say) a specified Type I error a.
This conflict can easily be resolved, however, if one is willing to modify the classical test in (2.3) to incorporate the possibility of no-decision. With this in mind, let ro E min(co, cl) and a. E max(co,el); then the modification of the classical test (2.3) for the simple hypotheses (2.1), which includes a nodecision region, is if B(x) j ro, reject Ho, if ro < B(x) < ao, make no decision, if B(x) 2 ao, accept Ho.
Another way of saying this is that, if it is desired to treat mo and ml symmetrically, with error probabilities of Type I and Type I1 both to equal a specified a , then introduction of a no-decision region is necessary.
EXAMPLE 2 (Continued). With a predetermined and desired probability a of the Type I error, simple calculations yield co = 2& and el = 2(1 -a). The disagreement region between statisticians A and B disappears only with a = 0.3819, at which point co = el = 1.2360. This, of course, would also be the "critical value" used in the alternative test Ta. With a = 0.25, the disagreement region between the two statisticians is (r,, ao) = (1,,1.5), somewhat larger than the no-decision region (1, z/Z)obtained in TT.
Observe that, as a decreases, the disagreement region increases in size. For instance, with a = 0.05, this region is (0.4472, 1.9).
TESTING A COMPOSITE HYPOTHESIS
The test TT can also be used in the composite hypothesis case. Suppose we observe the realization x of the random variable X E Z from a density f(xl0), with 0 being an unknown element of the parameter space O. In the sequel, we let Po(.) denote conditional probability given 0 E O. Consider the problem of testing simple versus composite hypotheses as given by (3.1) Ho: 0 = Oo versus HI: 0 E 01, where O0 $ O1 c O. Often we will take to be O1 = {0 E O: 0 # 0,). As in Section 2.2, we assume the default prior probability TO = 112 for the simple hypothesis Ho: 0 = Oo, while assigning to O1 the prior density g(0)/2, where g is a proper p.d.f. over O1. For this case, the Bayes factor in favor of Hois exactly as given in (2.2), that is, B(x) = mo(x)/ml(x), but now with mo(x) = f (~l 0~) and Note that ml and mo are the marginal densities of X conditional on H1 and Ho being true, respectively. [For a frequentist, g might be thought of as a weight function which allows computation of an average likelihood for H I , namely, ml(x) in (3.2).1 For a Bayesian, the test of (3.1) can thus be reduced to the equivalent test of the simple hypotheses Ho: X -mo(x) versus HI: X -ml(x).
Hence, modulo the no-decision region, the modified Bayesian test, TT, is the natural Bayesian test of the hypotheses in (3.1).
For the conditional frequentist who wishes to test Ho: 0 = Oo against H1: 0 E 01, the conditional error probabilities arising from (2.4) and from use of the conditioning statistic S in (2.11) would be (3.3) a(s) E PQo(rejecting HoI S(X) = s ) and (3.4) P(01s) P,(accepting HoIS(X) = s).
One should observe that, since H1 in (3.1) is a composite hypothesis, the conditional probability of type I1 error is a function of 0, analogous to one minus the power function in classical statistics. In the following theorem, we show that TT still defines a type of valid conditional frequentist test for this situation. THEOREM 1. For the test TT of the hypotheses (3.1) and the conditioning statistic given in (2.111, a(s) E a*(B)[defined by (2.8)l and
where g(01s) denotes the posterior p.d.6 of 0 condi-EXAMPLE 3 (Two-sided normal testing). We contional on H1 being true and on the observed value sider the same basic setup of Example 1: based on of S(X).
X n -M(0, u2/n), u2 known, we wish to test
The equality of a(s) and a*(B) in the above the-(4.1)
H,: 0 = 0, versus HI: 0 # 0,, orem was, in a sense, our primary goal: the conditional Type I error probability and the posterior probability of Ho are equal. Since Type I error is (rightly or wrongly) perceived to be of primary interest in classical statistics, the agreement of the two reports for the suggested procedure is, perhaps, crucial to its acceptance. The situation for Type I1 error is more complicated because the frequentist probability of Type I1 error necessarily depends on the unknown 0, while P*(B), the posterior probability of HI, is necessarily a fixed number. The relationship in (3.5) between . P*(B) and the conditional frequentist Type I1 error probability P(0ls) is, however, quite natural: p*(B) can be interpreted as the average of the conditional Type I1 error probabilities, with the average being with respect to the posterior distribution of 0 given s. To many, this averaging is a considerable improvement over the common classical practice of simply picking a plausible value of 0 and reporting the power at that value. Averaging is also typically viewed as sensible when there are nuisance parameters.
Of course, there is nothing to prevent a frequentist from reporting the entire function P(0ls) [or the conditional power function, 1-P(01s)I. Indeed one might argue that this is beneficial if the prior distribution has been chosen in a "default" fashion (cf. Jeff r e y~, 1961), since alternative "averages" of P(0ls) might be desired. In practice, however, the simplicity of just reporting p*(B) will probably be hard to resist.
There is one oddity here from a Bayesian perspective. It is that p*(B) is not the average Type I1 error with respect to the posterior distribution of 0 given H, and the data, but is instead the aver-, age Type I1 error with respect to the posterior distribution given HI and given S = s. In any case, , conditioning on S is, in a sense, the most conditioning that is allowed for a frequentist and, from the Bayesian perspective, the final answer, P*(B), is fine.
SOME APPLICATIONS
We present several appli'cations to standard testing problems. To simplify the notation, we let, in this section, a*(x) = a*(B(x)) = B(x)/(l + B(x)) for some specified value of 8,. A natural choice of the conditional prior (given H1 is true) for 0 over the set E (0 # 0,) is a conjugate prior. Hence we assume that g in (3.2) is the M ( p , ku2) p.d.f. Here p and k are assumed to be known. The parameter p is the conditional prior mean of 0, given HI is true. This allows, under HI, a measurable shift of the conditional prior p.d.f. of 0 away from Ho.Let A = (8, -p)/&u. When A = 0, the prior p.d.f. is symmetric about 8,. This choice of A is often considered as the default choice for applications and was used in Example 1.Also in Example 1, the default choice of k = 2 was made; the resulting M(0, 2u2) prior is similar to the Cauchy(0, u2) default prior recommended by Jeffreys (1961) .
As before, we let z denote the standard test statistic z = ,hi(%, -Oo)/u. It is easy to verify that the (conditional) marginal p.d.f.'s of z corresponding to Ho and HI,respectively, are In this case, no explicit expression for the critical value a is available, but a can be found using the following set of equations. For any b > 0, let z: be the two solutions of the equation B(z) = b; it follows from (4.4) that Using (4.6), the value of a is determined by the equation where z: is given by (4.6) and Ad-
It is clear that a = a(kn, A) depends on A and (with a known k) on the sample size n. In Table 2 we present values of a for several choices of A and kn. Note also that, for the suggested default choice k = 2 and A = 0, a closed form approximation to a (accurate to within 1%) was given in Example 1.
ILLUSTRATION Fisher
Belle ( . if z Iz; or z 2 z: , reject Ho and report the CEP a*(z), if z; < z < z; or z; < z < z l , make no decision, if z; I z I z;, accept Ho and report the CEP p*(z). The choice of conditional prior (given H1 is true) for 6 over the set 0, -( 8 < 80) is With this prior p.d.f., the marginal p.d.f (3.2) (given H1 is true) of z becomes Note that, in this case, mo(z) remains unchanged. Hence the corresponding Bayes factor can be written as
Again, it can be verified that the no-decision region is of the form (1, a), where a can be determined numerically by the following set of equations:
-00
Thus the test TT (as presented in terms of the standard test statistic z) is ' i f z 2 zl, reject H o and report the CEP a*(z), TT: . if z, < z < zl, make no decision, if z I z,, accept H o and report the CEP ,G*(z). 
To proceed with a conditional frequentist interpretation of the Bayes test, we need to reformulate the test slightly. The difficulties are that (i) H o is, itself, composite and (ii) improper prior distributions were used. The most direct solution is initially to suppose that we will base the test on the statistic y in (4.10). We have seen a Bayesian justification for doing so, namely, that the Bayes factor in (4.9) depends only on y; and y is the standard classical test statistic for the problem at hand, arising from, say, the likelihood ratio test.
Write the density of y as f (y lo1, . . . Here, using (4.9) and (4.11), a (as well as yl and y,) can be found by numerically solving the following system of equations:
I
In terms of the statistic y in (4.10), this test has the form if Y 2 yl, reject H o and report the CEP a*(y), TT: if y, < y < yl make no decision, if Y IY,, accept H o and report the CEP P*(Y). As an illustration, consider the case with p = 1; this is equivalent to the normal two-sided test with unknown a2.Note that, in this case, y = t2, where t denotes the standard t-test statistic. In comparison, the classical a-level two-sided test of (4.8) (with p = 1)can be given in terms of the statistic (4.10) as if y > tE12, reject H o and report error probability a, if y i tz12, accept Idoand report the probability of Type I1 error;
here t , !, is the (a/2)-level critical value from the t(,-l)-distribution.
The default prior g(5) that we recommend for this testing problem is This prior yields, for p = 1, the analysis recommended by Jeffreys (1961) , since it can be shown that la^) (formed by integrating over 5) is then Cauchy(0, a2). In Table 4 , we present the value of to.o2, along with the values of a , f i and 6as
were determined numerically for selected choices of n under the prior (4.14).
ILLUSTRATION
Now assume that 2 (Continued). a is unknown. This corresponds to the case of p = 1 in the null hypothesis (4.8) above. The calculated value of the test statistic (4.10) is y = 0.343. For the default prior (4.14), we find from Table 4 that 6= 1.123. Thus again, we accept Ho and report CEP P* = 0.186 [computed from (4.9)l.
For general p, the choice of g (5) in (4.9) to be computed by one-dimensional integration, regardless of p. The choice of g([) in (4.14) is not the only "default" choice that is reasonable. In particular, this choice of g implies that A = p;/a2 has a prior density which is roughly proportional to A(P-')/~ for small A. Sometimes, however, (4.8) is more naturally thought of as testing Ho: A = 0 versus Ha: A > 0, in which case a prior density for A which is positive at zero may be more intuitively appealing. A choice of g that achieves this goal is g([) = (1/2)(1+ [)-3/2. The resulting prior has the same tail behavior for large A as the earlier choice, but is positive at zero. EXAMPLE 6 (ANOVA). We continue with the same basic setup as in Example 5, but now we are interested in testing, with p > 1, the composite hypothesis (4.15) H,: p1 = p2 = . . . = pp (equal to, say, p) against the alternative HI: not all pi are equal. We assume a similar hierarchical prior structure for this testing problem: choose as the first-stage prior, nl(pi la2, t ) , the M ( p , [a2) distribution for the i.i.d. pl, p2, .. . ,pp; choose, for the second-stage prior, the usual noninformative prior for (p, a2), that is, n2(p, a 2 ) = ( l / a 2 ) d p d a 2 , which (independently) [ Now, for any specified prior g([), the test T T of hypotheses (4.15) follows exactly as in Example 5. The values of a , y1 and ya are determined numerically, using (4.16) and (4.17) in (4.13). In Table 5 we provide the values of a for selected choices of n and p under the prior (4.14) for g([).
ILLUSTRATION 3 (Pappas and Mitchell, 1985) . A n experiment was conducted to determine whether mechanical stress can retard the growth of soybean plants. Young plants were randomly allocated to two groups of 13 plants each. Plants in one group were mechanically agitated by shaking for 20 minutes twice daily. At the end of the experiment, the total stem length (in centimeters) of each plant was measured. The raw observations, in increasing order, are as follows: 
CONCLUDING REMARKS Testing a Precise Hypothesis
In this paper, discussion was restricted to testing of simple hypotheses or testing of a composite alternative hypothesis and a precise (i.e., lower dimensional) null hypothesis. The decision whether or not to formulate an inference problem as one of testing a precise null hypothesis centers on assessing the plausibility of such an hypothesis. Sometimes this is easy, as in testing for the presence of extrasensory perception, or testing that a proposed law of physics holds. Often it is less clear. In medical testing scenarios, for instance, it is often argued that any treatment will have some effect, even if only a very small effect, and so exact equality of effects (between, say, a treatment and a placebo) will never occur. While perhaps true, it will still often be reasonable to formulate the test as testing the precise hypothesis of, say, zero treatment difference, since such a test can be shown to be a very good approximation to the optimal test unless the sample size is very large (cf Berger and Delampady, 1987) . This is an important issue, because whether one formulates a test as a test of a precise hypothesis or as, say, a one-sided test can make a huge difference in the Bayesian posterior probabilities (or conditional frequentist error probabilities), in contrast to classical unconditional testing, where the error probabilities only vary by a factor of 2. Since this issue is so important in Bayesian or conditional testing, we will belabor the point with an additional illustration. ILLUSTRATION 4. Suppose one is comparing a standard chemotherapy treatment for cancer with a new radiation treatment. There is little reason to suspect that the two treatments could have the same effect, so that the correct test would be a one-sided test comparing the two treatments. If, instead, the second treatment has been the same chemotherapy treatment, but now with (say) steroids added, then equality of treatments would have been a real possibility, since the steroids might have no substantial additional effect on the cancer. Hence one should now test the precise hypothesis of no treatment difference, using the Bayesian or conditional frequentist test. (We do not mean to imply that one need only carry out the relevant test here; rather we are saying that the relevant test is important to do as part of the overall analysis.)
Note that the null hypotheses in Illustrations 2 and 3 are both plausible hypotheses.
A final comment on this issue is that precise hypothesis testing should not be done by forming a traditional confidence interval (frequentist or Bayesian) and simply checking whether or not the precise hypothesis is compatible with the confidence interval. A confidence interval is usually of considerable importance in determining where the unknown parameter (say) is likely to be, given that the alternative hypothesis is true, but it is not useful in determining whether or not a precise null hypothesis is true. For discussion of this point, see Berger and Delampady (1987) .
Choice of the Conditioning Statistic
The first point to stress is the unreasonable nature of the unconditional test (when used for postexperimental assessment of accuracy) and the even more unreasonable nature of the P-value (when incorrectly viewed as an error probability). In a postexperimental sense, the unconditional test is arguably the worst possible frequentist test; for instance, in testing of simple hypotheses, it can be formally established, under many reasonable formulations of postexperimental accuracy, that unconditional frequentist tests are worse than any conditional frequentist tests having the same rejection region. (These results will be reported elsewhere, as will partial generalizations to the type of hypotheses considered in this paper.) Furthermore, it is in some sense true that the more one can condition the better (see also Kiefer, 1977, Discussion and Rejoinder) ; in this regard, note that the tests we proposed have the maximal degree of conditioning that is possible. Unfortunately, among those tests with a maximal degree of conditioning, there does not appear to be any single optimal choice. (In testing simple hypotheses the situation can be different; see Brown, 1978.) Hence there will be a degree of arbitrariness to the choice of the conditioning statistic, which many may find to be unappealing. It is thus important to keep in mind that the only frequentist alternative to this arbitrariness is to use the unconditional test, which is (often) the uniquely worst test from a postexperimental perspective.
Conditioning on ancillary statistics is familiar but, as mentioned earlier, suitable ancillary statistics rarely exist for testing. Furthermore, it is far from clear that conditioning on ancillary statistics is always best. Consider Example 2, for instance. Conditioning on the ancillary statistic led to a conditional Type I1 error probability that was ac-tually constant over the acceptance region, even though the likelihood ratio (or Bayes factor) varied by a factor of 2 over that region! In contrast, our recommended conditioning statistic led to conditional Type I1 error probabilities that varied quite sensibly over the acceptance region.
It is sometimes argued that conditioning on nonancillary statistics will "lose information" but nothing loses as much information as use of unconditional testing in postexperimental inference (effectively replacing the data by the indicator on its being in the acceptance or rejection region); and since our conditioning leads to Bayesian posterior probabilities as the conclusion, Bayesians at least should agree that no information is being lost. Finally, it is crucial to remember all of the advantages (mentioned in the Introduction) that accrue from using a conditioning statistic that results in error probabilities with a Bayesian interpretation.
Choice of the Prior on the Alternative Hypothesis
This is the stickiest issue: each choice of prior distribution on the parameter space of the alternative hypothesis will lead to a different conditioning statistic, and hence to a different conditional frequentist test. In one sense this is wonderful, in that it says that both Bayesians and frequentists have the same problem: whether one chooses to phrase the problem in terms of choice of the prior distribution or choice of the conditioning statistic is simply a matter of taste. (Of course it can be argued that choice of the prior is much more intuitively accessible than is choice of the conditioning statistic.) But that does not settle the question of what to do.
A subjective Bayesian has a ready answer: "Elicit your subjective prior distribution on the parameter space of the alternative hypothesis, and use the Bayes test; if you wish to use a conditional frequentist test, use that with the corresponding conditioning statistic." (Actually, of course, the subjective Bayesian would also insist that the prior probabilities of the hypotheses be elicited and utilized. That would require the modifications discussed in BBW.)
We have no disagreement with this answer, except that we also want to provide a default test, for those who are unable or unwilling to elicit a prior distribution. What we have done in Section 4, therefore, is to define what we consider to be attractive default Bayesian tests (following Jeffreys, 1961) and provide their conditional frequentist analogues. This, in fact, defines a new joint Bayesianfrequentist research agenda for testing: develop attractive default Bayesian tests for all situations, and then translate them into their conditional frequentist analogues. (For the development of general default Bayesian procedures, two interesting recent approaches are described in Pericchi, 1996, and O'Hagan, 1995.) We have frequently heard the comment that nonBayesians will not accept these conditional frequentist procedures because their development utilizes a prior distribution. It seems absurd, however, to reject a procedure that is arguably highly attractive from a pure frequentist perspective, simply because a Bayesian tool was used in its derivation. We suspect, therefore, that what is really intended by such comments is to suggest that the appearance of statistical objectivity is often considered to be important and that there is concern that a procedure that uses a prior distribution will not be perceived to be objective. While not passing judgement here on the possibility or desirability of "objectivity," we would argue that the proposed default conditional tests have every bit as much claim to objectivity as any other frequentist procedure. They are specific procedures that can be used without subjective input, and have frequentist properties that can be evaluated on their own merits.
Generalizations
We have not considered situations involving composite null hypotheses, except those that can be reduced to simple hypotheses by some type of invariance reduction (e.g., the ANOVA example). In principle, composite null hypotheses can be treated in the same fashion as composite alternative hypotheses; that is, be reduced to simple hypotheses by Bayesian averaging. This will be a far more controversial step for frequentists, however, since classically the treatment of null hypotheses and alternatives has been very asymmetric. For instance, many frequentists will welcome the notion of "average" power that arises from the conditional frequentist tests that we consider, but will perhaps be wary of any notion of "average" Type I error.
As discussed in BBW, the general framework applies equally well to sequential experiments. One can develop conditional frequentist tests that essentially agree with Bayesian tests, and hence which essentially ignore the stopping rule. This is potentially revolutionary for, say, clinical trials. It appears necessary, however, to "fine tune" the new sequential tests, so as to obtain a satisfactory trade-off between the size of the no-decision region and the expected sample size of the experiment. This work will be reported elsewhere.
Other Approaches and Comparison
A number of other approaches to data-dependent inference for testing have been recently proposed.
UNIFIED FREQUENTIST-BAYESIAN TESTING
These include the developments in Bernardo (1980) , Hwang et al. (1992) , Chatterjee and Chattopadhyay (1993) , Schaafsma and van der Meulen (1993) , Evans (1994) and Robert and Caron (1995) . While being interesting and worthy of study, these alternative approaches all have one or more of the following disadvantages: (i) requiring new evidential concepts that would require extensive study and experience to understand properly; (ii) possessing significantly non-Bayesian or nonfrequentist properties, which would prevent members of either paradigm from accepting the approach; and (iii) being difficult to implement in all but relatively simple situations.
In contrast, the approach we advocate possesses none of these disadvantages. It does not really involve new concepts, since conditional frequentist error probabilities are quite familiar to many statisticians; likewise the interpretation of Bayesian posterior probabilities is familiar. One might argue that it is difficult to develop and understand the recommended conditioning statistic, but this understanding is really only necessary for those developing the methodology. Most practitioners would need only to know the actual test procedure and that the reported error probabilities can either be interpreted as posterior probabilities (with, say, default priors) or as frequentist error probabilities conditioned on a reasonable statistic reflecting the strength of evidence in the data. Note, in particular, that the actual conditioning statistic, for a default conditional test that becomes standard, need not be presented in an applied statistical report, any more than one now needs to present all the background properties of the itandard unconditional test that is chosen. This is assuming, of course, that a default conditioning statistic is being used, rather than one tailored to subjective prior beliefs; in the latter case, reporting the conditioning statistic (or, better, the prior) would seem only fair.
Likewise, the testing paradigm we propose should be acceptable to both frequentists and Bayesians. Although the proposed tests are mainly traditional ' Bayesian tests, it is perhaps the Bayesians who will most object to this paradigm; while there are compelling reasons for frequentists to shift to the conditional frequentist paradigm, there are no compelling reasons for Bayesians to alter their approach. For instance, many Bayesians would see little reason to introduce formally a no-decision region.
Some Bayesians might be attracted by the longrun frequentist properties of the new tests, in that frequentist properties do not depend on the prior distribution. This would seem to imply some type of robustness of the methodology with respect to the prior. The situation is unclear, however, because it could be claimed that it is "robustness for the wrong question." We would, at least, expect Bayesians to agree that these new tests are considerably better than the classical unconditional tests, and, most important, the answers obtained in practice by "pure" Bayesians and by non-Bayesians who adopt this new paradigm will now typically be quite similar.
Finally, implementation of the new paradigm is relatively easy, in many cases easier than implementation of classical unconditional testing. This is because Bayesian testing is often much easier to implement than unconditional frequentist testing, and the new tests are essentially based on Bayesian tests. The only significant adaptation that is needed is computation of the no-decision region, which is usually a computation of only modest numerical difficulty.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 1. We will only prove the second assertion since the proof of the first assertion is provided in BBW. We assume that $(I) 2 1 in (2.10). The case $(I) < 1 follows similarly and therefore is omitted. Notice that, since g is a proper p.d.f over e l , the following relation holds: --P*(B), using the fact that B(x) = *(s) on the set {B(x) > $(l) and S(x) = s).
Testing of a precise hypothesis has been one of the areas in which fundamental disagreement in practical conclusions has been the rule. The point of the article is to observe that this need not be so, and that classical statisticians should, by frequentist reasoning, reach essentially the same conclusions as do Bayesians. There is no need to embrace the Bayesian philosophy for our profession to reach essential agreement concerning what to do with these testing problems.
We often treat statistical paradigms other than "our own" by attempting to limit their options and then showing that this limited version is inadequate. If one limits frequentism to unconditional (preexperimental) evaluations or to limited forms of conditioning (e.g., conditioning only on ancillary statistics), then it is easy to show that the paradigm is inadequate. Frequentists must be allowed the option of reporting general conditional (postexperimental) evidence.
Professor Louis proposes a different "unification" of Bayesian and frequentist statistics, based on allowing multiple types of reports and upon possibly matching the unconditional frequentist answer with Bayesian posterior answers. Considering this latter aspect first, let us look at actual numbers. Suppose that, in the situation of Example 3 (testing a normal mean), a frequentist wants to use cu = 0.05. Then, if n = 20 and the reasonable prior variance multiplier k = 2 is chosen, solving Louis's equation for the prior probability of H o yields 7~ = 0.051. So a Bayesian can report the same number (a posterior probability of 0.05) as the unconditional frequentist's cu, but only by a priori being virtually convinced that H o is true at the desired level! It would obviously be very questionable for the Bayesian to simply make the unconditional frequentist conclusion of significant evidence against the null hypothesis, essentially "hiding" the fact that the a priori odds were stacked 19 to 1 against Ho. Unconditional and conditional numbers are simply very different entities, and attempting to "match" them makes little sense. (In contrast, attempting to "match" conditional frequentist and conditional Bayesian numbers is, at least, plausible.) Perhaps Louis meant for the statistician in this situation to report that "if the prior probability of H o were 0.051, then, after observing z = 1.96, the posterior probability of Ho would be 0.05, that is, equal to a." But this would be a very convoluted way of communicating -the same information as that provided by the conditional error probability in Table 1 . Of course, one might also want to consider alternative values of the prior variance multiplier k; indeed Bayesians would urge that this be done, with subjectively chosen ranges of k being considered. However, this additional complication is unlikely to appeal to frequentists, especially as the message does not change much. For instance, even the rather bizarre choice k = 0.142 yields n-= 0.10, and it can be shown that this is the largest obtainable value of .rr (when a = 0.5 and n = 20).
The basic fact here is that, when z = 1.96 in the situation of Example 1 (or Example 3), the data is roughly equally supportive of H o and H I , and all statisticians must find a way to report this. Such a report occurs naturally from the Bayesian perspective and our paper shows that frequentists can also report this fact if they adopt the conditional frequentist perspective. There is, of course, nothing wrong with a = 0.05 as a preexperimental measure of the quality of the experiment but, postexperimentally, it is simply not a scientifically tenable report from either a Bayesian or a (conditional) frequentist perspective; we thus strongly disagree with Louis's statement that "Frequentists can ignore all posterior statements, communicate %hem all or operate in a middle ground, depending on their degree of purity," or at least we would strongly disagree if the phrase "posterior statements" was replaced by "conditional or postexperimental statements." In this regard, Louis also makes the curious statement concerning frequentists that ". . . so long as the usual preposterior properties are in place. . . some conditional statements are fine, but why not have them be completely Bayes?" Obviously the unconditional properties of any statistical procedure can be calculated and reported, but doing so "on the side" does not make one a frequentist. When z = 1.96, one can report both a = 0.05 and that the posterior probability of H o is 0.496 but, if one's scientific conclusion is based on the posterior probability, the mere reporting of a does not make one a frequentist. (Of course, we have shown that 0.496 is also a longrun conditional frequentist error rate, and hence can be used by a frequentist.) We are not suggesting that a good statistician is wrong to mix frequentist and Bayesian statements; we are simply saying that one cannot arbitrarily label such mixed inferences as "frequentist," and then say that the problem is solved.
As an aside, it is worth mentioning that unconditional frequentists might argue that, for a fixed a , observations near the rejection boundary are unlikely to occur, and hence the postexperimental difficulty mentioned above is rare. This ignores two practical realities. The first is the ubiquitous use of P-values, instead of fixed a levels; P-values virtually always greatly overstate the evidence in testing of precise hypotheses. The second reality is that optional stopping is all too often used, but not reported, so that we "happen to see" data near the rejection boundary far more often than we actually should.
THE NO-DECISION REGION
Professors Lindley and Louis express concerns involving the no-decision region. Lindley points out that a Bayesian would treat "no decision" as a third possible action and would ideally introduce associated losses to deal appropriately with the three decisions. This is certainly true, and it is indeed unlikely that the ensuing procedure would exactly match the new procedure. However, inferential Bayesians (as opposed to decision-theoretic Bayesians) would probably not find our no-decision region objectionable, in that it seems to coincide in practice with data which is evidentially quite weak. In regards to Lindley's point here, Lawrence Brown adds the following comment: "I think of the no-decision region as an 'embarassing decision' region. It is a region where the conditional frequentist differs in conclusion from the Bayesian, and where it may be argued that the conditional frequentist reasoning somewhat breaks down. I am inclined to agree with Lindley that viewing this as a third decision region can, formally, lead to trouble. Fortunately, this does not occur very often." Professor Louis's concern with the rate at which the probability, under a composite alternative, of the no-decision region approaches zero is appreciated. (Our comment in the paper was misleading in this regard since, as Louis observes, we do not really have i.i.d. observations from ml.) Indeed, the rate will typically not be exponential for the composite alternative situation; for instance, we recently established that the rate is actually O(n-'l2 log n ) for the situation of Example 3. (General results concerning rates for the composite alternative case are being pursued by one of us.)
Professor Louis goes on to question whether the no-decision region is really "small" in practice. Perhaps the most crucial point here is that the no-decision region virtually never intersects the rejection region (for the testing of a precise null hypothesis). Hence all we are discussing is the size of the no-decision region when considering whether to formally accept a null hypothesis or to say "no decision." Since the new testing procedure is arguably already better than classical practice in allowing for quantified acceptance of the null hypothesis, the concerns of Louis in this regard would seem to be obviated.
CONDITIONING AND ANCILLARITY
All discussants mention, with varying degrees of emphasis, that the lack of ancillarity of the conditioning statistic that we use will be a cause for concern among classical statisticians. As emphasized by Kiefer (1977) , however, there is no reason, within frequentist theory, to restrict conditioning to ancillary statistics. Indeed, another interpretation of our paper is that it clarifies a situation in which frequentists apparently need to proceed beyond conditioning on ancillary statistics in order to achieve sensible answers. (This is why we so heavily stressed in the paper the unsuitability of the unconditional classical approaches to testing of precise hypotheses.) The commonly stated intuitive reasoning behind restricting conditioning to ancillary statistics, and our view as to why this reasoning is faulty, was discussed in Section 5 of the paper. We repeat only the comment that it is puzzling to see Bayesians object to the conditioning in the paper, since we show the result to be essentially equivalent to full Bayesian conditioning. Arguments aside, however, we quite agree with Professor Hinkley's "One might wish that the conditioning statistic had a more familiar feel to it." All we can say is that familiarity increases with use and, sometime down the road, it will likely feel completely natural to condition on this type of statistic.
In regards to conditioning, Professor Louis raises the interesting point that the new procedure is not guaranteed to condition on, say, an ancillary stopping time. While true, the situation is roughly that a mole hill is left behind after a mountain has been removed. The "mountain" that obstructs classical statistics in this regard is the fact that unconditional testing is highly dependent on the stopping rule used, leading, for instance, to extremely complicated procedures in sequential testing. With the new procedure, as discussed in Berger, Brown and Wolpert (1994) , the only dependence on the stopping rule (and the only possible dependence on an "ancillary" stopping time), arises in determination of the no-decision region. However, the no-decision region is rarely an issue in applications, as mentioned above, so that any stopping rules (and not just those that are ancillary) become irrelevant in applications. This is of enormous practical benefit. Note that we are not objecting to the principle that one should condition on an ancillary stopping time; we are simply arguing that formal principles are often violated in minor ways to achieve major ends.
On the issue of conditioning, Robert Wolpert adds: "While the argument for conditioning is perhaps strongest when the conditioning statistic is ancillary, we should be willing to discard the modicum of information contained in a 'nearly ancillary' statistic in exchange for freedom from the dangers of misinterpretation and dependence on the stopping rule that plague the classical test."
BAYESIAN CONCERNS
Professors Lindley and Louis implicitly suggest that there is not much here for Bayesian practice. Louis even provocatively asks if we would use these procedures in actual practice. Bayesians may well prefer to continue using their existing methodology, and we have no quarrel with that. However, in practice, we frequently encounter situations in which a full Bayesian analysis is not tenable, for a variety of reasons, and we are certainly delighted then to have available a method which yields essentially the same answers but can be justified from a frequentist perspective. Second, at least some Bayesians do take comfort in knowing that their procedures have a frequentist interpretation. Finally, echoing Professor Hinkley, those who seek to understand the debates on foundations of statistics (and this includes many Bayesians) will need to adapt to the possibilities inherent in conditional frequentist analysis.
Professor Lindley takes us to task for encouraging the confusion between P ( A I B ) and P ( B I A ) .
Indeed, he has a point. Previously, one of us taught elementary testing by discussing both the classical a-level and the posterior probability of the null hypothesis, and was successful in communicating the difference between P ( A I B ) and P ( B / A ) because these numbers (and the resulting conclusions) were so different. However, with the new procedure, these two probabilities will be equal, so that testing of a precise null hypothesis will no longer serve as a good pedagogical example of the "prosecutor's fallacy." In a related vein, a Bayesian might dislike the new procedure because it eliminates one of the biggest contrasts between Bayesian and classical methods, and hence eliminates one of the most powerful rationales for the Bayesian position. Our guess, however, is that non-Bayesians who take the time to truly understand the issues here will end up with considerably increased sympathy for the Bayesian position. Robert Wolpert's view of this issue is: "The intention behind the development was precisely to find a statistical testing procedure which yields the same error probabilities for frequentists who condition on the hypothesis or Bayesians who condition on the data. We do not confuse the two types of error probabilities, but sought a test which is safe to use even for those who do confuse them, especially the large proportion of nonstatisticians who routinely misinterpret P-values as posterior probabilities." Professor Lindley's comments concerning minimaxity are rather curious. First of all, we did not actually recommend using the minimax rule here, since that would involve making unreasonable conclusions for certain data (corresponding to the no-decision region). Also, general criticisms about minimax procedures should not be used to indict specific minimax procedures. After all, there are numerous Bayes rules with respect to proper priors which also happen to be minimax, and we doubt if Lindley would insist that any such proper priors be barred from considefation by a subjectivist! That said, we agree with Lindley's underlying point, which is that the procedure we recommend can probably be shown to be formally incoherent. Of course, most Bayesians (as well as non-Bayesians) typically operate in practice in ways that are formally incoherent; the key question is whether the incoherence is significant or minor, and our judgement is that any incoherence found here would be of the minor variety.
LOSSES AND PRIORS
Professor Lindley, in discussion more related to Berger, Brown and Wolpert (1994) , makes several observations concerning the fact that the new testing procedure can be modified to allow for varying prior probabilities of the hypotheses and varying losses for incorrect decisions. He first asks how prior probabilities and losses are to be chosen, if not in subjectivist fashion? We would agree that subjectivism is needed for their choice, but note that we are primarily advocating the new testing method for use in "default" or "inferential" fashion; hence our restriction in this paper to (essentially) the assumption of equal prior probabilities of hypotheses and equal losses in incorrect decisions. Lindley also notes that the new testing method does not depend only on the product of prior and loss, as Bayesian procedures should. Again, however, this "slight incoherency" only manifests itself in the no-decision region, not in reported expected losses. Lindley later argues for keeping inference distinct from decision, which is what we are trying to do in the present paper. We would not rule out, however, the possibility of successful development of conditional frequentist decision theory along the lines suggested by Berger, Brown and Wolpert (1994) .
Professor Louis notes that, in classical testing, the choice of hypotheses is usually based on priors and losses of the experimenter, and hence contains a message. This is certainly true, but is it desirable? We do not feel that "hiding" losses and priors through such choices is a desirable feature of classical statistics. We suspect that Louis would agree with this; indeed he lauds the Bayesian approach as allowing for explicit study of sensitivity to priors and losses, and we would agree that this is a big advantage. Likewise, Louis suggests that the default priors and losses used in the new procedures be made available to the analyst; we would certainly not disagree.
GENERALIZATIONS
Professor Hinkley concludes by asking about extensions to situations where the alternative is vague or aonparametric. To see that one must remain very cautious about unconditional methods in such situations, see Delampady and Berger (1990) . However, admittedly, extending the conditional frequentist approach to such problems may be quite challenging. Indeed, exploratory analysis, when alternatives are vague, may well remain mostly an art.
Professor Louis raises the interesting question of how a frequentist should produce a confidence set for 8 after rejecting Ho. We first note that this is a problem common to all frequentist analysis: the conclusion from one part of the analysis can formally affect the conclusion from another. In practice, this issue is usually ignored, with the "standard" confidence set being reported upon rejection of Ho. When the "standard" confidence set is satisfactory conditionally (in the sense of approximately corresponding to posterior probability intervals, as Professor Hinkley notes), we do not view the situation as one of great concern. Incidentally, we much prefer constructing frequentist confidence sets by using "probability matching" posterior probability intervals, rather than by inverting tests. The optimality properties inherited through the "inverting" process are not very compelling; indeed, the resulting confidence sets can have very poor conditional behavior.
CONCLUDING REMARK
There is a certain irony to this discussion: although the disagreements expressed herein might seem rather severe, we suspect that the testing methods the discussants and ourselves would actually prefer to use in practice are similar, with heavy emphasis on Bayesian analysis with sensitivity studies. Indeed, our view of the discussions from this perspective is that they were quite wonderful, providing very good advice as to how (philosophy aside) statistical testing should be done. However, especially for non-Bayesians or Bayesians operating in non-Bayesian environments, we agree with Professor Hinkley that the new conditional testiog methods are "genuinely useful additions to our statistical toolkit."
